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STATEIVIENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Thomas Zachary Alec Paulk appeals from the judgment of conviction entered for 
forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object following a jury trial. On appeal, 
he asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that an out-of-
court statement made by the victim was admissible as either an excited utterance or a 
statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. He also asserts that, 
regardless of whether the statement satisfied either of the two identified hearsay 
exceptions, the admission of the statement violated his rights under the Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Finally, he asserts that the district court erred 
when it imposed an excessive sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, and when 
it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion seeking reduction of 
that sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Thomas Zachary Alec Paulk was charged by Information with lewd conduct with 
a child under 16 and forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object after waiving 
his right to a preliminary hearing. (R., pp.20-24.) The matter proceeded to a jury trial 
on both charges. 
The charges concerned a serious vaginal injury sustained by L.A.B., the two-and-
one-half year old daughter of Nicole Orme, his live-in girlfriend. Together they resided 
with L.A.B., Ms. Orme's older daughter, then five, and Mr. Paulk and Ms. Orme's son, 
who was then less than one year old. The injury occurred shortly after Ms. Orme left 
the house to pick-up dinner at a nearby Subway restaurant. She received a call from 
1 
Mr. Paul approximately ten minutes after she left telling her to "hurry and get home" 
because L.A.B. was injured and bleeding. Ms. Orme returned home within five minutes, 
examined L.A.B., and noticed that "there was a separation between the vagina and the 
bum." Mr. Paulk explained that he didn't know how the injury had occurred, as he was 
outside having a cigarette when he heard a crash and discovered her "hurting." 
(Tr., p.239, L.4 - p.244, L.16.) Ms. Orme took L.A.B. to another room and asked her 
what happened, "but all she kept telling me was, I don't know. I don't know."1 
(Tr., p.249, Ls.16-18.) 
Ms. Orme took L.AB. to an urgent care facility in nearby Ammon where L.A.B. 
was initially seen by intake nurse Melissa Boyce. 2 She drove past several other urgent 
care centers to go to one in Ammon because "they had our records already, and I even 
believe it's the only - it's the 24 hour one at that time." (Tr., p.250, L.8 - p.251, L.10.) 
Ms. Boyce asked Ms. Orme to remove L.A.B.'s diaper to examine her, and while she 
was doing so, Ms. Boyce asked L.A.B., "did you get an owie?" L.A.B. responded, 
''Zackie did it."3 (Tr., p.252, L.11 - p.253, L.4.) A doctor then examined L.A.B. and 
determined that she needed to be transported to the hospital next door to be sedated 
and further examined. (Tr., p.254, Ls.2-14.) Surgery was performed on L.A.B. 
(Tr., p.266, Ls.12-24.) 
Ms. Boyce testified that on the night that L.A.B. was brought in she was working 
at Mountain View Ready Care, and that she is a radiologic technologist who also 
1 Ms. Orme was asked about L.A.B.'s verbal skills. She answered, "She's my outgoing 
wild cr1ild. She talks. She does full sentences. She's capable of understanding a full 
conversation." (Tr., p.249, Ls.19-25.) 
2 Ms. Boyce happens to be Ms. Orme's "ex-husband's brother's wife." (Tr., p.251, 
Ls.15-18.) 
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petforms "a lot of nursing duties," including doing intake on patients. (Tr., p.290, L.16 -
p.292, L.14.) She started the intake by asking Ms. Orme several questions from an 
assessment sheet. (Tr., p.293, L.9 - p.294, L.1.) While Ms. Orme was removing 
L.A. B.'s diaper at Ms. Boyce's request, Ms. Boyce "leaned over and asked, did you get 
an owie? And she said, Zackie did it." Her demeanor at that time was that of "a normal 
girl her age ... not overly excited, not overly upset at all." (Tr., p.293, L.9 - p.296, 
L.24.) When asked whether L.A.B. was "upset angry, or in any way agitated," she 
responded in the negative. When asked if L.A.B. was calm, she responded, "Fairly 
calm." (Tr., p.298, Ls.12-16.) 
The doctor who examined L.A.B. that night, Jonathan McGregor, testified that he 
works as an OBGYI\J with his own practice and is familiar with vaginal trauma. He 
testified that there are two types: blunt and penetrating. Blunt vaginal trauma most 
often occurs in children "because it's usually the children that are doing crazy things like 
riding bikes without a seat on it, you know, or trying to walk a balance beam or trying to 
walk a bar and get a straddle injury type of thing." Those types of injuries are more 
likely to be the result of accidents. On the other hand, "[p]enetrating trauma usually 
either has to do with some sort of an assault where there's force exerted or, you know, 
in forceful [sexual] play." (Tr., p.344, L.4 - p.347, L.14.) 
The night that he treated L.A.B. he was moonlighting at the Ready Care. After 
examining her, he determined that she needed to be taken to the hospital for an exam 
under anesthesia to determine the extent of the injury. Because of the nature of the 
injury, it is unusual "for a little girl to bleed vaginally," he took forensic photographs of 
3 It was a running joke around the house for L.A.B. and her older sister to say, "Zackie 
did it," whenever "something got broke[n] or the kids were playing and something went 
wrong or what not .... " (Tr., p.285, Ls.8-21.) 
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the injury before repairing it. (Tr., p.348, L.4 - p.352, L.7 .) He concluded that the type 
of injury was a penetrating trauma due to the lack of injury to the surrounding tissue and 
the fact that the injury "extended so far up into the vagina " Inflicting the injury required 
"quite an exertion of force," and in his opinion could not have been the result of an 
accident. (Tr.,p.364,L.15 p. L.16.) 
Karen Hansen, a pediatrician and professor of pediatrics at the University of 
Utah's medical school, testified that, "if inserted forcibly," a finger or fingers could have 
caused L.A.B.'s injury. When asked the amount of force necessary to produce the 
injury, she testified, "I would think that the person who inserted a finger there would 
have been frustrated, angry, upset. I don't think anything can just slip in there and do 
this much damage." (Tr., p.548, L.9 p.551, L.16, p.569, Ls.2-14.) 
Detective McKenna testified that he was assigned to investigate this case. 
(Tr., p.487, Ls.1-9.) On the night of the incident, he went to the apartment and met with 
and interrogated Mr. Paulk. During that interrogation, Mr. Paulk told several different 
stories as to how L.AB. was injured. Following the interrogation, he had Mr. Paulk 
arrested, after which he heard him say to Officer Christopherson 11something about, 
okay, I'm going to tell you the truth, and I heard anger and mentioned - I thought I heard 
him say it wasn't out of anger, it was out of frustration. I put my finger inside of her and I 
pushed down hard." (Tr., p.508, L.23 - p.525, L.4.) Officer Chrisopherson testified that 
he was speaking with Mr. Paulk shortly after his arrest, telling him now "ridiculous" his 
stories sounded, to which Mr. Paulk responded by saying, 
[O]kay, I did it out of anger. And said he had - the little girl was crying and 
she wouldn't tell him where it hurt, and he was upset, so he began 
pushing her down on the bed. And his fingers were going inside of her. 
And he said that he wasn't doing it out of punishment. He was just angry. 
4 
And then after that, he stopped taking. And to quote him, he said, I'm 
fucked. 
(Tr., p.480, L.25-p.481, L.14.) 
Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Paulk guilty of both lewd conduct and forcible 
penetration by a foreign object. (R., pp.75-76.) He was initially sentenced to concurrent 
unified terms of fifteen years, with five years fixed. (Tr., p.732, Ls.14-22.) Mr. Paulk 
filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.98.) 
Several months later, the State filed a Motion to Dismiss Count I, the lewd 
conduct charge. The basis for the motion was Mr. Paulk's statement to the polygrapher 
during his psychosexual evaluation that the act in this case was done "out of anger," 
rather than for sexual gratification, and therefore did not have "the requisite intent to 
commit the crime alleged in Count I." As such, the prosecutor felt ethically-obligated, 
under Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(h), to pursue the motion with respect to 
the lewd conduct charge. (R., pp.121-22.) The district court granted the State's motion, 
and ordered the lewd conduct charge to be dismissed. (R., p.124.) 
The original judgment of conviction was vacated, and following a new sentencing 
hearing, Mr. Paulk was resentenced to a unified term of fifteen years, with five years 
fixed, on the remaining charge. (R., pp.131-32.) Following his resentencing, Mr. Paulk 
filed a timely Rule 35 motion, requesting a reduction in his sentence. (R., p.11.) 
Following a hearing at which new information was presented (Tr.9/10/12, p.5, L.16 -
p.6, L.7 (including the fact that, the preceding weekend, Mr. Paulk was attacked in 
prison, consistent with threats he received while in the Bonneville County Jail, due to 
the nature of the charge for which he was convicted)), the district court denied the Rule 
35 motion. (Supp. R., p.28.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted an out-of-court 
statement by the victim based on its conclusion that the statement was both 
an excited utterance and a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment? 
2. Even assuming that the out-of-court statement of the victim was not inadmissible 
hearsay, did the district court violate Mr. Pau!k's rights under the Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause when it admitted the statement over his 
objection? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
fifteen years, with five years fixed, following Mr. Paulk's conviction for forcible 
sexual penetration with a foreign object? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Paulk's Rule 35 
motion in light of the new information provided, namely, that, since he was 
sentenced, he has been the victim of threats and physical attack due to the 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted An Out-Of-Court Statement 
By The Victim Based On Its Conclusion That The Statement Was Both An Excited 
Utterance And A Statement Made For Purposes Of Medical Diagnosis Or Treatment 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Paulk asserts that the district court erred when it admitted an out-of-court 
statement made by the victim based on its conclusion that the statement was both an 
excited utterance and a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 
Because the totality of the circumstances did not satisfy the requirements for it to fall 
under either exception, the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the 
statement over Mr. Paulk's objection. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision as to whether to admit a statement as a hearsay exception is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 567 (2007) (so 
holding with respect to the excited utterance exception). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted An Out-Of-Court 
Statement By The Victim Based On Its Conclusion That The Statement Was 
Both An Excited Utterance And A Statement Made For Purposes Of Medical 
Diagnosis Or Treatment 
The State filed a motion in limine seeking, inter afia, a pre-trial determination as 
to the admissibility of a statement made by L.A.B. to Melissa Boyce, a medical 
professional at the Ready Care facility to which she was taken for treatment of her 
injury. The State asserted that the statement was not inadmissible hearsay because it 
fell "under the exceptions of excited utterance and statement made for purposes of 
medical diagnosis or treatment." (R., p.58.) 
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The statement was made shortly after Ms. Boyce instructed L.A.B.'s mother to 
put her on the examination table. According to Ms. Boyce, "I said, [L.A.B.] did you get 
an owie? She said, Zackie did it, to me. And that's [when] Nicole [L.A.B.'s mother] was 
pulling her diaper down, and I saw a lot of blood." (Tr., p.206, Ls.8-14.) Ms. Boyce 
testified that it was "important for us to know the mechanism of injury so that we know 
how to treat the patient." (Tr., p.207, Ls.10-11.) On cross-examination, Ms. Boyce 
acknowledged that the "primary purpose" of asking a question concerning the 
mechanism of such injuries is to determine whether law enforcement needed to become 
involved in the case. 4 Ms. Boyce acknowledged that she had a statutory duty as a 
mandatory reporter of suspected abuse. (Tr., p.211, L.22 -- p.213, L.12.) At the trial, 
Ms. Boyce was asked to describe L.A.B.'s demeanor during the intake, to which she 
responded, "She seemed like a normal girl her age to me, not overly excited, not overly 
upset at all." (Tr., p.296, Ls.10-13.) 
Ms. Orme testified that, at the time the statement was made, it had been 
approximately one hour and forty-five minutes since she had returned home after 
Mr. Paulk called to tell her that L.A.B. was hurt. (Tr., p.187, L.7 - p.189, L.9.) When 
asked to describe L.A.B.'s "physical demeanor" and "emotional demeanor" at the time 
that the statement was made, Ms. Orme testified, "She was clinging to me, also wanting 
to sit on my lap. Normally in the doctor's office, she's running around, playing, trying to 
keep her from breaking things, but she pretty much just sat on my lap the whole time we 
were at the doctor's office." She was not crying at the doctor's office, although she did 
4 Ms. Boyce's testimony in this regard was inconsistent. On redirect, she testified that 
she would let her supervisor know if information related to a reporting requirement 
resulted from such a question, but "my main purpose [in asking the question] is doing 
my job. I need to ask that question so I can tell the doctor and he can treat her." 
(Tr., p.217, Ls.4-16.) 
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cry on the way to the office and complain about "her bum hurting." (Tr., p.191, L.25 -
p.192, L.14.) 
Ultimately, the district court concluded that the statement was admissible as both 
an excited utterance and a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment. (Tr., p.227, L.9 - p.233, L.24.) 
1. The Statement Does Not Meet The Requirements Of The Exception For 
Statements Made For Purposes Of Medical Diagnosis Or Treatment 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(4) provides that statements that are made under the 
following circumstances are not excluded by the general bar on hearsay: "Statements 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or 
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source thereof insofar as 
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." I.RE. 803(4) (emphasis added). From 
the plain language of the rule it is apparent that, in order to meet the exception, the 
statement must satisfy three requirements. First, it must have been made for the 
specific purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. Second, it must consist of a 
description of symptoms, pain, sensations, or the source of the medical problem. Third, 
the information in the statement must be pertinent to obtaining a diagnosis or treatment. 
In State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507 (Ct. App. 1996), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
considered I.R.E. 803(4) in relation to statements made to two physicians by a young 
child, N.M., during medical examinations following a claimed molestation. The 
defendant argued on appeal "that the prosecution did not show that N.M. a child of four 
years and two months, appreciated the importance of speaking truthfully to her doctors, 
and that, consequently, N.M.'s statements to the doctors were not demonstrated to fall 
within the Rule 803(4) exception." Kay, 129 Idaho at 518. The Court began its analysis 
9 
by noting, "Where an adult is the hearsay declarant, the motive to speak the truth to a 
physician in order to advance a self-interest in obtaining proper medical care for the 
declarant or another is generally assumed." Id. In rejecting Kay's argument that a 
special rule applied to young children, the Court instead explained that a trial court 
should take the following approach in "determin[ing] whether a young child's statement 
was 'made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment"': 
Id. 
The court may consider any factors which bear upon the likelihood that the 
child made the statement for this purpose, including evidence indicating 
whether the child understood the need to speak truthfully to the physician 
and factors that otherwise indicate the reliability of the statements. 
Circumstances to be considered may include: the child's age; whether the 
child understands the role of the physician in general; whether the child 
was suffering pain or distress at the time; whether the child's statements 
were inappropriately influenced by others, as by leading questions from 
the physician or a previous suggestive interrogation by another adult; 
whether the examination occurred during the course of a custody battle or 
other family dispute; the child's ability and willingness to communicate 
freely with the physician; the child's ability to differentiate between truth 
and fantasy in the examination itself and in other contexts; whether the 
examination was initiated by an attorney (which would suggest that its 
purpose was for litigation rather than for treatment); and the timing of the 
examination in relation to the trial. If the trial court finds that the foregoing 
factors, and others reasonably related to the inquiry, give little reason to 
doubt the child's motivation, the court may infer that the criteria of I.R.E. 
803(4) are met. 
In this case, the district court concluded that 803(4) was satisfied, reasoning, 
The main reason the question is asked, pursuant to her [Ms. Boyce's] 
testimony, is so that treatment can be provided. And I think we could all 
submit outlandish medical scenarios. [The prosecutor] submits one with 
an ax in the head, and [defense counsel] submits a gunshot wound, and 
I'm sure in the course of treating patients, there becomes the most 
obvious cases. The factual circumstances surrounding this case are by 
no means clear. I'm sure there is going to be medical testimony on this 
case as to - as [defense counsel] is beginning to hone in on is whether 
this was accidental trauma or nonaccidental trauma. 
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So given the nature of the circumstances, the purpose behind the 
question(5] is related to the Court's satisfaction, reasonably pertinent to the 
diagnosis or treatment. 
(Tr., p.233, Ls.5-20.) The district court erred in concluding that the motivation of the 
questioner is the key issue in determining whether 803(4) is satisfied. It is clear from 
the plain language of the rule, clarified in Kay, that the focus is on the motivation and 
understanding of the person making the statement, not the person soliciting the 
statement. Having failed to conduct the analysis required under the rule and consider 
the circumstances set forth in Kay, the district court abused its discretion when it 
concluded that the statement met the legal standard set forth in 803(4). 
The district court's conclusion is erroneous for other reasons, as well. While 
Mr. Paulk does not dispute that there is some evidence to support the second 
requirement, as the statement appears to be a vague description of the source of the 
injury, he does dispute whether the first and third requirements were satisfied. With 
respect to the first, it is not clear that L.AB. was making the statement for the purpose 
of receiving medical diagnosis or treatment. Neither Ms. Boyce nor Ms. Orme testified 
that they told LAB. the reason that the question was being asked, or that she 
understood the purpose of the questions. With respect to the third, it is not clear how 
knowing specifically who caused the injury is "reasonably pertinent" to obtaining a 
diagnosis or treatment for the injury. Ms. Boyce testified that knowing the mechanics of 
5 Interestingly enough, the district court concluded, for purposes of its excited utterance 
analysis, that the answer was "spontaneous and not entirely responsive." (Tr., p.231, 
Ls.7-13.) To the extent that the subjective intent of the questioner is relevant under 
803(4), the fact that the answer was "spontaneous and not entirely responsive" cuts 
against the district court's conclusion that the answer was reasonably pertinent to 
diagnosis or treatment. 
11 
the injury was part of conducting an intake because it is helpful in fashioning treatment,6 
but never testified that knowing the identity of the person who caused the injury was 
reasonably pertinent to either diagnosis or treatment. (Tr., p.217, Ls.4-16 (Ms. Boyce 
testifying that she needed to ask a question concerning the mechanics of the injury "so I 
can tell the doctor and he can treat her").) 
The statement did not satisfy all three requirements under Rule 803(4) and was 
improperly admitted over Mr. Paulk's objection. such, Mr. Paulk respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this matter for a 
new trial at which such evidence will not be presented. 
The Statement Does Not Qualify As An Excited Utterance 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides that "[a] statement relating to a startling 
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused 
by the event or condition" is not excluded by general bar on hearsay. LR 803(2). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals summarized the law concerning the excited 
utterance exception as follows: 
To fall within this exception, there must be a startling event that renders 
inoperative the normal reflective thought process of the observer, and the 
declarant's statement must be a spontaneous reaction to that event rather 
than the result of reflective thought. In considering whether a statement 
constitutes an excited utterance, the totality of the circumstances must be 
considered, including the nature of the startling condition or event, the 
amount of time that elapsed between the startling event and the 
statement, the age and condition of the declarant, the presence or 
absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was volunteered or 
made in response to a question. 
6 When asked by the prosecutor why it was important to know the mechanism of the 
injury for purposes of treatment, Ms. Boyce responded, "That's a good question." 
Without explaining why it was important she explained that she asks it is because on 
the intake form it asks for the "nature of illness or mechanism of injury" and doctors 
have told her to do it. (Tr., p.207, L.7 - p.208, L.7.) 
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State v Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 285 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations omitted). As 
the Utah Court of Appeals has explained, "The classic example of an excited utterance 
is a witness's exact recollection of the declarant's spontaneous 'sound bite' - an 
uncoached blurting out - made while the declarant observed the exciting event or 
closely thereafter." West Valley City v. Hutto, 5 P.3d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognize[d] that the excited utterance exception 
has broader application in sex crime cases than in other situations because the distress 
of the event can remain bottled up until the victim has the opportunity to talk about the 
incident." State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 975 (1992) (emphasis added) (citing 
State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1 (1986)). In Parker, the victim of a rape told her story to her 
cousin, a Fish and Game officer, approximately two hours after she escaped from her 
rapist. Her cousin testified that when she recounted her story, "she was crying, red-
eyed, looked very tired, and looked like a lot had happened to her." In considering the 
totality of the circumstances, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded, "Since a fourteen-
year-old girl told a trusted individual of her alleged sexual assault at virtually the first 
opportunity she had while in a state of obvious emotional distress, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting her taped statement as an excited utterance." 
Parker, 112 Idaho at 4 (emphasis added). 
Unlike the facts in Parker, here Ms. Boyce testified that, at the time the statement 
was made, LAB. "seemed like a normal girl her age to me, not overly excited, not 
overly upset at all." (Tr., p.296, Ls.10-13.) Additionally, LAB. had the opportunity to 
make an excited utterance, during the time that her mother drove her to the medical 
facility, while she was crying and complaining about pain. The timeline to which 
Ms. Orme testified makes it clear that a significant amount of time, at least forty-five 
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minutes, had passed between the incident and the period of time in the car, which itself 
lasted at least ten minutes. (Tr., p.186, L.17 - p.187, L.13.) Furthermore, Ms. Orme 
and L.A.B. spent at least fifteen minutes in the waiting room before being taken to an 
exam room. (Tr., p.188, Ls.1-4.) Finally, it was at least another ten minutes in the 
exam room, with Ms. Boyce taking L.A.B.'s vital signs, before the statement was made. 
(Tr., p.188, Ls.16-20.) 
Additional circumstances that cut against the district court's conclusion that the 
statement was an excited utterance are that the statement was made in response to a 
question, that L.A.B. had been asked what happened nearer in time to the incident to 
which she responded by repeatedly saying that she didn't know, which indicates that the 
statement to Ms. Boyce was the product of reflective thought, rather than a statement 
made while under the influence of a startling event that rendered her normal reflective 
thought process inoperative. Given the totality of the circumstances, and even 
accepting the special treatment given to alleged victims of sexual abuse under Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 803(2), the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the 
statement was made under circumstances satisfying the excited utterance exception to 
the general bar on hearsay. 
11. 
Even Assuming That The Out-Of-Court Statement Did Not Constitute Inadmissible 
Hearsay, The Admission Of The Statement Violated Mr. Paulk's Rights Under The Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Paulk maintains that, even assuming that the out-of-court statement did not 
constitute inadmissible hearsay, the admission of the statement over his objection 
violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. 
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B. Even Assuming That The Out-Of-Court Statement Did Not Constitute 
Inadmissible Hearsay, The Admission Of The Statement Violated Mr. Paulk's 
Rights Under The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause 
The statement at issue was made shortly after Ms. Boyce instructed L.A.B.'s 
mother to put her on the examination table. According to Ms. Boyce, "I said, [L.A.B.] did 
you get an owie? She said, Zackie did it, to me. And that's [when] Nicole [L.A.B.'s 
mother] was pulling her diaper down, and I saw a lot of blood." (Tr., p.206, Ls.8-14.) 
On cross-examination, Ms. Boyce acknowledged that the "primary purpose" of asking a 
question concerning the mechanism of injury is to determine whether law enforcement 
needed to become involved in the case.7 Ms. Boyce acknowledged that she had a 
statutory duty as a mandatory reporter of suspected abuse. (Tr., 11, - p.213, 
L.12.) 
In opposing use of the statement to Ms. Boyce, defense counsel argued, inter 
alia, 8 that the statement was inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation 
Clause because it constituted testimonial hearsay unless L.A.B. was available to testify. 
Specifically, defense counsel argued, 
And I'm sure it's - this Court is well aware that all medical providers in the 
State of Idaho are mandatory reporting agencies, teachers, doctors, other 
health care providers are mandatory reporting agencies. They have a 
statutory duty to notify law enforcement and make inquiries according to 
that statutory duty for the purpose of notifying law enforcement. This is 
their job. This is what they have to do. This makes the statement even 
though it was not done at the direction of law enforcement, it does make 
the statement, essentially, a statement that's testimonial in nature, 
because of the mandatory reporting and the procedures of this medical 
7 As noted above, Ms. Boyce's testimony in this regard was inconsistent. On redirect, 
she testified that she would let her supervisor know if information related to a reporting 
requirement resulted from such a question, but "my main purpose [in asking the 
question] is doing my job. I need to ask that question so I can tell the doctor and he can 
treat her." (Tr., p.217, Ls.4-16.) 
8 Defense counsel also disputed whether the statement met the requirements of an 
excited utterance or a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment 
under I.R.E. 803(2) and (4), respectively. That issue is discussed in Part I, supra. 
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establishment is put in place. Ms. Boyce is not a treatment nurse. She is 
not asking these question[s] to determine treatment. She's asking these 
questions to determine other information. 
\/Vith that, Your Honor, this does make the statement testimonial in nature, 
and I do believe it would make it subject to those provisions of Crawford[9], 
and unless this witness is available, this statement can't come in. 
(Tr., p.224, Ls.4-25.) 
In finding that admitting the statement would not violate the Sixth Amendment, 
the district court explained, "given the evidence that's been established, I don't think that 
this factual circumstance runs afoul with state - with the Cravvford case, 2004 Cravvford 
case. The main reason the question is asked, pursuant to her testimony, is so that 
treatment can be provided .... " (Tr., p.233, Ls.2-7.) 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part, 
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him .... " U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. In Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that, regardless 
of what a state's hearsay law might say, the Confrontation Clause bars the introduction 
of "testimonial evidence" absent a showing of "unavailability and a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
In Crawford, the Court explained that the "focus" of the Confrontation Clause was 
on "'witnesses' against the accused - in other words, those who 'bear testimony."' The 
Court explained, "'Testimony,' in turn is typically '[a] solemn declaration or affirmation 
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."' Id. at 51 (bracket in 
original) (citations omitted). Ultimately, the Court "le[ft] for another day any effort to 
spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,"' instead concluding, "Whatever else 
9 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, 
before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations." Id. at 68. 
In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), a case involving statements made 
to a 911 operator by a crime victim during an assault, the Court provided further 
guidance as to the meaning of testimonial, explaining, 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
In State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court considered 
whether statements obtained from a suspected victim of child abuse in an interview 
conducted by a nurse working at a forensic medical facility were testimonial under 
Crawford. Considering the totality of the circumstances the Court concluded that the 
statements were testimonial and barred by the Confrontation Clause because "[t]he 
circumstances surrounding this particular case objectively indicate that the primary 
purpose of the interview was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution, as opposed to meeting the child's medical needs." Hooper, 
145 Idaho at 145-46. Of further significance was the fact that "this interview took place 
after a medical assessment and separately from the medical assessment." Id. 
Furthermore, unlike the situation in Davis, the Court noted that here, "there is no 
evidence that the statements were made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating the primary purpose of the interrogation was to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." Id. 
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In Flores v. State, ·120 P.3d ·1170 (Nev. 2005), the Nevada Supreme Court 
considered whether statements made by the minor daughter of a woman charged with 
murdering the woman's stepdaughter, were testimonial. Those statements were made 
to "child abuse investigators [Durgin and Godman] and her foster mother, Yolanda 
Diaz." At trial, the State presented the daughter's statements to Durgin, Godman, and 
Diaz, describing what she witnessed her mother do that led to the death of the victim. 
Flores, 120 P.3d at 1171-73. 
In addressing the issue, the court noted Crawford's identification of three 
formulations of testimonial hearsay, namely, 
(1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent," e.g., 
"affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was 
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants 
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially"; (2) "extrajudicial 
statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions"; and (3) 
"statements that were made under circumstances that would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial." 
Id. at 1177 (quoting Crawford). The court concluded that the statements to the two 
investigators and the foster mother did not fall under the first formulation as "the 
statements to the surrogates were not in the form of prior testimony or affidavits," and 
"given [the daughter's] age and relationship to Flores, it is unlikely that she intended to 
testify through the surrogates or that she 'reasonably expected' that the statements 
would be used criminally against her mother." Id. at 1178. Considering the second 
formulation, the court concluded, "none of her statements were in a form described in 
the court's second illustration." Id. 
The court concluded that the statements fell within the third formulation because 
"they were statements that, under the circumstances of their making, 'would lead an 
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objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at 
a later trial."' Id. at 1178-79 (emphasis in original) (quoting Crawford). In concluding 
that the statements to Durgin and Godman "were clearly testimonial," the court noted 
"both were either police operatives or were tasked with reporting instances of child 
abuse for prosecution." Id. at 1179 (emphasis added). With respect to the statements 
to the foster mother, the court concluded that they "were spontaneously made at home" 
and "were not such that a reasonable person would anticipate their use for prosecutorial 
purposes." Id. 
In State v. Sanchez, 147 Idaho 521 (Ct. App. 2009), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
considered whether recordings of jail telephone calls between the two year old victim 
and her incarcerated mother were testimonial. The defendant was charged with first 
degree murder by abuse. The Court summarized the contents of the telephone 
recordings as follows: 
In one conversation, A.A. spontaneously stated to her mother that 
Sanchez was pushing her in the stomach and that she cried. In another 
conversation, A.A. stated that she cried and then made an unintelligible 
statement about her stomach. In another conversation, A.A. briefly spoke 
on the phone and made a comment about how she cried because 
someone was making her sick. In another conversation, A.A. stated that 
she was crying; however, it was unclear whether she said that because 
she was in pain or missed her mother. In the final conversation, A.A. 
stated that she was sick. 
Sanchez, 147 Idaho at 524. 
At the outset of its analysis, the Court noted, "We need not address the question 
of whether conversations between private persons can, under certain circumstances, be 
deemed testimonial," a question it noted was left open by the Supreme Court in Davis. 
Sanchez, 147 Idaho at 524. In concluding that the statements were not testimonial 
under Crawford and Davis, the Court explained, 
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The conversations lacked any degree of formality. The only reason the 
conversations were recorded was because of jail policy. To the extent any 
statement from A.A. can be said to have been elicited, it was in the nature 
of "what's wrong?" not "what happened?" This situation did not involve 
police, their functional equivalent, or formalities associated with in-court or 
extra-judicial statements contemplated as testimonial in Crawford . .. 
In this case, the primary purpose of the conversation was not to establish 
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. The 
statements made by A.A. were spontaneous, in which she principally 
described her feelings and the present state of her health . . . 
Furthermore, the statements were not made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that they would be 
available for use at a later trial. 
Id. at 525. 
Mr. Paulk asserts that a fair reading of the precedent discussed above leads to 
the conclusion that L.A.B.'s statement was testimonial hearsay inadmissible under the 
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause absent an opportunity to cross-examine 
L.A.B. 
First, the statement was "made under circumstances that would lead an objective 
witness to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). This is 
especially true in light of Idaho Code § 16-1605(1 )'s requirement that all persons who 
suspect child abuse are required to report such suspicions to law enforcement and the 
Idaho Supreme Court's recognition that "all persons are presumed to know the law ... 
. " Abercrombie v. State, 91 Idaho 586, 590 (1967). Second, unlike the situation in 
Davis, where the 911 caller was seeking assistance during an ongoing assault, L.A.B. 
was being asked a question that was relevant to establish the facts of a past event, 
closer to the "what happened" example discussed in Sanchez than the "what's wrong" 
example. Third, the questioner herself acknowledged that the "primary purpose" of 
asking about the mechanics of the injury was to determine whether law enforcement 
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needed to be contacted. Finally, in light of the reservation of the issue in Davis and 
Sanchez, the fact that Ms. Boyce was not a law enforcement employee or acting directly 
upon a law enforcement agency's request, is not dispositive, especially in light of the 
Idaho Legislature's decision to turn all Idahoans into police agents under Idaho Code 
§ 16-1605(1 ). This conclusion is sup po tied by the Nevada Supreme Court's statement 
in Flores that the statements there were testimonial because they were made to 
persons "tasked with reporting instances of child abuse for prosecution."1° Flores, 120 
P.3d at 1179. 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Paulk asserts that the district court erred 
when it concluded that the statement made by L.A.B. to Ms. Boyce was non-testimonial 
and that its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause. As such, he respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a 
trial at which his Sixth Amendment rights will be respected. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Fifteen 
Years, With Five Years Fixed, Following Mr. Paulk's Conviction For Forcible Sexual 
Penetration With A Foreign Object 
A Introduction 
Mr. Paulk asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, following his conviction for 
forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object in light of the numerous mitigating 
10 Mr. Paulk acknowledges that the Colorado Court of Appeals has recently explained, 
"Courts in other jurisdictions ... have held that the mere fact of a declarant making a 
hearsay statement to a statutorily defined mandatory reporter does not make the 
statement testimonial." People v. Phif!ips, _ P.3d _, 2012 WL 5266041 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted) (decision not yet final). 
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circumstances present in his case, including his remorse, mental health issues, history 
of traumatic brain injury, family support, and lack of any prior felony convictions. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of 
Fifteen Years, With Five Years Fixed, Following Mr. Paulk's Conviction For 
Forcible Sexual Penetration With A Foreign Object 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, 
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the 
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting 
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Paulk does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Paulk must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of 
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and 
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. Id. 
Mr. Paulk expressed remorse for causing L.A.B.'s injury. In recounting his 
version of events to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) writer, 
Mr. Paulk wrote that he lied to Ms. Orme about the cause of L.A.B.'s injury, claiming that 
she fell, because "I didn't know what to do, I was scared and in shock [because] I 
harmed her.'' When he saw the wound after Ms. Orme got home, he "almost threw up 
and got lightheaded." According to Mr. Paulk, he "couldn't stop shaking [because] the 
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fear and shock was overwhelming." (PSI, p.6.) Dr. Lindsey, the psychosexual 
evaluator, explained that Mr. Paulk suffers from a psychological disorder, Alexithymia, 
resulting from traumatic brain injury that prevents him from adequately showing his 
emotions, which could cause people to believe that he does not have adequate remorse 
for his actions (Psychosexual Evaluation, p.9), which could not be further from the truth, 
as, according to Dr. Lindsay, 
despite his Alexithymia which is responsible for his rather flat emotional 
expression, he also evidences what is in my opinion genuine remorse and 
regret about his violent act against [L.A.B.], which he appears to have 
shown since he first saw the blood flowing from her genital area 
immediately following his violent crime and which has continued to the 
present. 
(Psychosexual Evaluation, p.19.) 
Mr. Paulk has a history of head injuries, including suffering approximately six 
concussions. (Psychosexual Evaluation, p.7.) When he was eighteen months old, he 
"fell head first into an irrigation ditch" and was underwater for an unknown period of time 
before anyone noticed. At age three, he was in a car accident in which he was not seat-
belted, and in which the car rolled over several times. He has also hit his head 
frequently while dirt biking "crunching" his helmet, twice losing consciousness, including 
one instance in which he was unconscious for ten minutes, and another when another 
motorcyclist ran over his head following a crash. (Psychosexual Evaluation, p.7.) As a 
result, Mr. Paulk suffers from Static Encephalopathy, 11 including Alexithymia, and may 
11 The issue of repeated concussions causing encephalopathy has been in the news 
recently as a result of several former NFL players, including long-time San Diego 
Charger Junior Seau, committing suicide. Seau's family "described drastic changes 
they noticed in Seau during the final years of his life, including mood swings, 
depression, forgetfulness, insomnia and detachment." This type of chronic brain 
damage was found in Seau and "has also been found in dozens of deceased former 
players." Mark Fainaru-Wada, Jim Avila & Steve Fainaru, Doctors: Junior Seau's brain 
had GTE, ESPN: Outside the Lines (January 11, 2013), at http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/st 
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suffer from Complex Patiial Seizure Disorder. (Psychosexual Evaluation, pp.9-10.) He 
may also have "a full-blown bipolar condition," but it is difficult to diagnose in light of his 
Alexithymia. (Psychosexual Evalaution, p.12.) 
Mr. Paulk enjoys the support of family. He told the PSI writer "that he has a good 
relationship with both of his parents and that they are very supportive of him," including 
visiting him weekly in jail. (PSI, p.11.) Six friends and numerous family members 
provided letters of support on his behalf, including his mother, sister, step-grandmother, 
great-aunt, great-uncle, and L.A.B.'s aunt and uncle. (PSI, pp.12-13; Letters from 
Wendy Ellis, Peyton Altman, David Paulk, Brenda Ellis, Kathy and Tim Grebstad, 
Jessica Demotropolis, David J. Evans, Shirley Killam, Mike Demotropolis, Curtis Call, 
Shawn Call, and Samantha Richey (appended to PSI).) Upon his release from custody, 
he plans to live with his mother, step-father, sister, and nephew. (PSI, p.14.) 
This conviction represents Mr. Paulk's first felony conviction. (PSI, p.22.) At the 
time of this offense, Mr. Paulk was on probation for misdemeanor battery. (PSI, pp.9-
10.) According to his probation officer, "he did well on probation ... [and] was under 
minimum supervision at the time of the Instant Offense and that he had completed all 
requirements of supervision and was working to pay his fines and restitution at the time 
of his arrest." The probation officer explained "that she was shocked to learn of his 
offense as he was highly compliant with supervision," having taken a required course, 
paid supervision fees timely, and reported as required. (PSI, p.10.) Additionally 
mitigating is the fact that Mr. Paulk is relatively young, twenty-four years old (PSI, p.1 ), 




sentencing. See Brain Maturity Extends Well Beyond Teen Years, National Public 
Radio (Oct 10, 2011 ), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyld=14'1164708 ("A growing body of science say ... [t]hat critical parts of 
the brain involved in decision-making are not fully developed until years later at age 25 
") or so .. 
In light of the mitigating factors present in his case, Mr. Paulk asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, 
with five years fixed, for his first felony conviction. 
IV. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Paulk's Rule 35 Motion In 
Light Of The New Information Provided In Support Thereof 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted). 'The criteria for examining 
rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining 
whether the original sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive 
when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or 
additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id. (citation omitted). 
When new information has been presented in support of a Rule 35 motion, the 
appellate courts conduct "an independent review of the entire record available to the 
trial court at sentencing, focusing on the nature of the offense, the character of the 
offender and the protection of the public interest." Id. (citing State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
722 (2007)). When determining whether a sentence is excessive, the appellate courts 
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"consider the entire length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard to 
determine its reasonableness." Id. (citing Oliver). Mr. Paulk asserts that the new 
information provided in support of his Rule 35 motion, when considered alongside the 
mitigating circumstances known to the district court at the time of sentencing, 
demonstrates that his underlying sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, is 
excessive. 
The new information provided in support of Mr. Paulk's Rule 35 motion was 
presented by defense counsel at the hearing on the motion. Defense counsel described 
some of that information as follows: 
I will indicate for the record Mr. Paulk is not present because he has been 
housed now with the Department of Corrections [sic] and is in Boise in 
custody there. I was just talking with his mother, and he just was attacked 
on Saturday. 
It's kind of a difficult situation for him. While he was housed here in the 
Bonneville County Jail, he was threatened by a number of individuals, 
because of the nature of these charges, with physical harm, including 
some individuals with gang affiliations, and they said that they would have 
the word out in Boise when he got there that he was to be taken care of. 
And at least one attempt has been taken now, so there's some concern 
raised by his mom. 
(Tr.9/10/12, p.5, L.16- p.6, L.4.) 
The remaining new information consisted of the fact that, due to the nature of his 
conviction, Mr. Paulk would not receive the type of treatment recommended by the 
psychosexual evaluator, namely, "neurological counseling and treatment regarding the 
violence issue," while incarcerated. Instead, the treatment available to Mr. Paulk is that 
which is geared toward sex offenders, which will not be helpful in light of the conclusion 
of the psychosexual evaluator, prosecuting attorney, and district court that Mr. Paulk 
was not acting for purposes of sexual gratification. (Tr.9/10/12, p.11, Ls.2-25, p.15, 
Ls.12-15, p.20, Ls.1-10, p.22, L.24 - p.23, L.3.) 
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Mr. Paulk asserts that, when the new information presented at his Ru 35 
hearing is considered alongside the mitigating circumstances known to the district court 
at the time of sentencing, the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 
35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons forth herein, Mr. Paulk respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial which the 
victim's inadmissible statement is not considered. Alternatively, if this Court concludes 
that the statement was properly admitted, he respectfully requests that this Court 
reduce his underlying by ordering that he be placed on probation. 
DATED this 30th day of January, 2013. 
SPENCERJ.HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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